Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European countries by Krouwel, A.
Working Papers Political Science No. 02/2003
ISSN 1569-3546
Amsterdam, August 2003
Department of Political Science  Phone  +31 20 444 6852
De Boelelaan 1081c – DBL 859  Fax       +31 20 444 6820
1081 HV Amsterdam
The Netherlands      
Internet: www.politicalscience.nl
Email:  info@politicologie.vu
Measuring presidentialism of
Central and East European countries
André Krouwel
e-mail: apm.krouwel@fsw.vu.nl
1Abstract
Political elites in newly democratising countries create political institutions, whose nature 
and functioning determine the level of legitimacy of everyday political decisions. With this 
legitimacy perceived by both the mass public as well as the competing elites, democratisers aim 
to create a stable democratic institutional regime. One of the most crucial choices democratisers 
face is the design of the relation between the executive and the legislative. In political science 
literature the simple trichotomy of parliamentarism, presidentialism and semipresidentialism 
is dominant, although more extensive classifications have been suggested. This paper seeks to 
move away from classification into the next step of scientific sophistication by measuring the 
relative level of presidentialism and parliamentarism of political regimes. Thus, it is possible to 
analyse subtle and minor institutional innovations over time within the same political system. 
This is particularly important when studying political regimes in transition. In this paper I 
will show that a relative measure of presidentialism and parliamentarism can be used to closer 
examine the assumed relationship between different regime types and their stability.
A revised version of this paper will appear in Acta Politica.
1Introduction
In political science literature it is often assumed that institutional arrangements and 
political stability are closely related. Juan Linz (1990a; 1990b), for example, has argued 
that presidentialism leads to political instability because of its dual popular mandate and 
dual democratic legitimacy. Both the president and the parliament derive from a popular 
election which may lead to deadlock in terms of policy-making. Also presidentials systems 
are characterised by rigidity because of the fixed term of the president. This not only leads to 
inertia, but also to instability as the removal of the president can not occur for mere political 
reasons and his or her political foes will thus have to attempt to remove the president by legal 
means. The single person executive is also prone to conflict as, besides the risk of insanity, 
alcoholism and other physical and psychological flaws, there is a substantial accumulation 
of power within one individual with all the dangers of abuse of power and authoritarianism. 
Furthermore, presidential systems create a partisan head of state which may also lead to conflict 
about the competencies and prerogatives of the president. Finally, presidential systems are 
said to create weaker parties and lower levels of party discipline in parliament. Parliamentary 
systems also have their weaknesses as they create substantial fusion between the executive and 
the legislative branch of government, which goes against the democratic separation of power. 
Furthermore, parliamentarism is said to create parliamentary polarisation and fragmentation 
which leads eventually to government instability.
 Despite the clear and present dangers of presidential political systems, presidentialism 
has become the dominant form of executive power in the world during the 20th century. With 
the demise of communism in Central and East European countries as well as the transition 
from authoritarian regimes in the Americas, presidentialism is now the most common form 
of political executive (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996, 41). In the third wave of democracy 
(see Huntington 1991) the executive in the form of communist party leadership and military 
rule gave way to more democratic regimes, often some form of presidentialism. Although 
most ʻdemocratisers  ʼopted for a presidential regime, this does not mean that the more than 
110 countries - now considered to be ʻpresidential  ʼsystems - all have similar constitutional 
arrangements, political institutions and practices. There are immense differences between, for 
example, the political system in Peru, Poland, Mexico, Ukraine, Russia and the United States, 
all of which classified as presidential systems (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996, 43).
 Classification of political regimes depends on the definition of concepts. Since there 
remains substantial disagreement on the definition of presidentialism, it is consequently often 
unclear how to categorise the various political regimes. In addition, classifications are seldom 
mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive. Although such lack of precision is not unknown 
to scholars involved more generally in the classification of political regimes, this imprecision 
inhabits a meaningful comparative analysis as a result of ʻmisclassification  ʼ or ʻconcept-
stretching  ʼ(Sartori 1970, 1991). In this paper I will first try to curb this problem by constructing 
ʻminimal definitions  ʼwhich uses only the key characteristics of parliamentary and presidential 
systems.1 Secondly, I will use these core elements to characterise several Central and East 
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European countries by their relative level of presidentialism.2 In doing so, I will distinguish 
between the formal constitutional institutions and the ʻde facto working  ʼof East and Central 
European systems. Another drawback with mere classification of political regimes is that these 
regimes are not static over time. Therefore, I will develop a more flexible characterisation 
of regimes, that is a relative scale of presidentialism/parliamentarism in order to move away 
from the too rigid trichotomy of parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism (see 
also Baylis 1996, 299). By analysing the changes that have taken place on these essential 
characteristics in Central and Eastern European countries it is possible to establish the extent 
and direction of transformation of these political systems since 1990. The central question 
of this paper thus boils down to: to what extent can political systems in Central end Eastern 
Europe be characterised as presidential and in what direction have these systems developed in 
the last decade?
Parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential executives
As stated above, the most prevalent typologies to classify political systems are parliamentary, 
presidential and semi-presidential types of executive power (Verney 1959; Duverger 1980).3 
Stepan and Skach (1993, 3) even assert that “with one exception (Switzerland), every existing 
democracy today is either presidential (as in the United States), parliamentary (as in most 
Western Europe), or a semi-presidential hybrid of the two (…).” Despite the widespread use of 
these typologies, there exists little agreement on how to categorise central and East European 
political systems. In the table below I present the categorisation of 12 new democracies 
according to five studies.
Table 1. Classifications of central and East European political regimes
Country Easter (1997) Baylis (1997) Derbyshire and Derbyshire 
(1996)
Elgie (1998) Stepan and Skach 
(1993)
Bulgaria Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Semi-presidential Dual system
Czech Rep. Parliamentary Parliamentary Dual system Parliamentary Parliamentary
Estonia Parliamentary Semi-presidential Dual system Parliamentary Dual system
Hungary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary
Latvia Parliamentary Semi-presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Dual system
Lithuania Dual system Semi-presidential Dual system Semi-presidential Presidential
Macedonia # Semi-presidential Limited presidentialism Semi-presidential #
Poland Dual system Parliamentary Limited presidentialism # Presidential
Romania Presidential Presidential* Limited presidentialism Semi-presidential Presidential
Russia Presidential # Limited presidentialism # Presidential
Slovakia Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary
Slovenia Parliamentary Semi-presidential Dual system Semi-presidential Dual system
# = not available. * Baylis (1997, 300, fn. 7) argues that it is not even clear to country experts what type of executive is prevalent in 
Romania
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It is clear that, at least among these authors, some kind of consensus exists only about the 
classification of Hungary and Slovakia (as parliamentary systems) and on Romania and Russia 
(as presidential systems), although the ʻlevel of presidentialism  ʼ of the latter two remains 
disputable (see also Sekelj 1999, 266). To this problem on the ʻlevel of presidentialism  ʼI will 
return later in this paper.
 The dissension on how to classify central and East European democracies derives from 
the fact that there remains substantial controversy on what precisely constitutes parliamentary 
and presidential government (Elgie 1998). Nevertheless, Lijphart (1992, 2) suggests that 
a few core features are relatively unequivocal. He argues that scholars agree that the main 
difference between these systems can be found in the relationship between the executive and 
the legislative power. Most authors focus on two crucial differences between parliamentarism 
and presidentialism, namely (a) the dependence on legislative confidence and governmental 
responsibility and (b) a fusion or separation of executive and legislative powers. Shugart and 
Carey (1992) employ two similar criteria for the classification of political regimes, specifically 
(a) the dependency of government survival on either the president or parliament and (b) the 
locus of principal authority over the government. Shugart and Mainwaring (1997, 15) define 
the two basic characteristics of presidentialism very pointedly as “separate origin” (in terms 
of separate popular mandates) and “separate survival” (fixed term in office). In a similar 
vein, Stepan and Skach (1993) also refer to both dimensions when they argue that ʻpure 
parliamentarism  ʼ and ʻpure presidentialism  ʼ each have two fundamental characteristics: “a 
pure parliamentary regime in a democracy is a system of mutual dependence: 
1. The chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the legislature and can fall 
if it receives a vote of no confidence.
2. The executive power (normally in conjunction with the head of state) has the capacity to 
dissolve the legislature and call for elections.
A pure presidential regime in a democracy is a system of mutual independence:
1. The legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy.
2. The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy” 
(Stepan and Skach 1993, 3-4).
In addition to these two principle differences, Lijphart also points to a third fundamental 
distinction, namely between the single-person executive in presidentialism and the collective 
(collegial) executive of parliamentarism (Lijphart 1992, 3; 1999, 117).4
The core characteristics of (semi-)presidentialism and parliamentarism 
On the basis of these two core dimensions, I suggest that parliamentary systems are 
characterised by the election of a legislative assembly from which a (majority) government 
is drawn, sometimes after lengthy coalition negotiations. This government holds office for as 
long as it has sufficient support (or ʻconfidenceʼ) in the assembly. Tenure of government is thus 
dependent on the confidence in the legislature and individual ministers as well as the collective 
cabinet are responsible to parliament. A government can be dismissed by a legislative vote of no 
confidence, making tenure in office determined only by a maximum number of years. In turn, 
the cabinet can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. This means that parliamentarism 
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denotes a fusion of executive and legislative powers. Nevertheless, the role of the head of 
state (either a president or monarch) is strictly separated from the executive office and reduced 
to mainly ceremonial and formal competencies. Both the party composition of government 
as well as the allocation of ministerial portfolios is beyond control of the head of state. The 
Prime Minister and his or her cabinet have primary responsibility for both policy-making and 
policy-implementation.
 A crucial feature of presidential systems, on the contrary, is the strict separation of 
executive and legislative structures. This separation is established by independent popular 
mandates for both the executive and the legislative. The directly elected president (a single 
person executive) is both head of state and head of government: appointment and dismissal 
of ministers is the discretion of the president. Presidents also serve a fixed term, as parliament 
can not force the president to resign for political reasons (presidents can only be removed 
by impeachment). This pre-determined tenure in office is established by the provision that 
survival of the executive is independent of parliamentary support and the government is not 
accountable to parliament, only to the president. Primary responsibility for policy making 
resides in the legislative, yet the president can veto legislation. In turn, the legislative can 
override this veto.
 Political systems combining elements of both models, yet often seen as a distinct 
regime type, are semi-presidential systems. This dual type of executive combines a directly 
elected president (who has obtained his or her own popular mandate) with a government drawn 
from a directly elected legislative and responsible to parliament. In this hybrid system the 
president often has substantial executive prerogatives, usually in the field of Foreign Affairs 
and Defence. Commonly, the president can dissolve parliament, call for new elections and 
appoint ministers that subsequently have to be approved by parliament. Nevertheless, most 
executive control and responsibility for policy-making usually rests with the Prime Minister 
and her or his cabinet. Here, semi-presidentialism is seen as a hybrid of both presidential 
and parliamentary institutional arrangements, which will become evident in the next sections 
where a relative measure of the level of parliamentary and presidential regimes is developed. 
The core elements of parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism are 
summarised in table 2.
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Table 2. Core characteristics of Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Semi-
presidentialism
Presidentialism Parliamentarism Semi-presidentialism
• Direct election of head of state • Indirect election of head of state • Directly elected president and 
government drawn from directly 
elected legislative  
• Prerogative of dissolving Parliament 
rests with the President
• Government (or Prime Minister) can 
dissolve Parliament
• President can dissolve parliament and 
call elections
• The head of state is directly 
involved in the formation of 
government (appoints ministers)
• The head of state has no formal 
powers in the formation of 
government
• The head of state can appoint 
ministers that have to be approved 
by parliament
• Government (and individual 
ministers) not responsible to 
Parliament
• Government needs to win a vote of 
Investiture in Parliament
• Government is responsible to the 
parliament
• President can introduce legislation • President can not introduce legislation 
nor veto legislation
• President can introduce legislation 
only within his prerogatives
• Head of state has executive powers • Head of state has no executive 
responsibilities
• President has substantial executive 
prerogatives. But most executive 
power rests with PM and cabinet 
• Government can ignore a 
parliamentary vote of no 
confidence
• Government must resign if it loses a 
vote of confidence
• Government must resign if it loses a 
vote of confidence
Four of these characteristics are related to the first Lijphardian dimension of presidentialism 
(dependence of government on legislative confidence and governmental responsibility), namely 
the requirement of a vote of investiture, the possibility of a parliamentary vote of confidence, 
the power to dissolve government and ministerial appointment. The second dimension, a 
fusion or separation of the executive and legislative powers, constitutes three features, which 
are the independent mandate of a direct election of the president or indirect election, the right 
to introduce legislation and the designation of executive powers to the president. This paper 
does not deal in detail with the use of these two dimensions nor with alternative dimensional 
distinctions, yet the research project does want to develop more independent measures of these 
two distinct dimensions of institutional arrangements.
Towards a presidentialism-parliamentarism scale
On the basis of these core characteristics of executive systems I can now develop a scale of 
presidentialism-parliamentarism. I will only use these core elements as items on a scale of 
parliamentarism and presidentialism in order to move away from the simple trichotomy. I do 
not use the items on the semi-presidential list as they are all elements that belong to either one 
of the ʻpure  ʼ types: presidentialism or parliamentarism. Utilising the constitutions of East-
Central European countries I will assign scores to each of the countries on all seven of these 
core features of presidentialism (see the Appendix for details of the measurement of each of 
the items on the scale). 
 This score of presidentialism differs in several ways from scores of ʻpresidentialism 
developed earlier in studies by Frey (1997), McGregor (1994) and Johannsen and Nørgaard 
(2003). The first crucial difference is the number of items included in the scale. In my score 
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of presidentialism I do not add all the powers constitutionally assigned to the president into 
one score. It seems to make more sense to identify the core elements of presidentialism, rather 
than including all powers and prerogatives of the president. Frey (1997), for example, regards 
the presidential prerogative to “address parliament” or “appoint the prosecutor general” 
equally important as the “right to dissolve parliament”, to “appoint ministers” and to “propose 
legislation”. I would argue that the latter three are far more consequential for the legislative-
executive power balance within a political system than the former two. This inclusion or 
selection of items thus concerns the weighting of the different items. Johannsen and Nørgaard 
(2003) weigh items differently by grouping them in three distinct types of power resources 
(symbolic resources, appointive resources and political resources), yet the same problem occurs 
as ʻthe appointment of the Ombudsman  ʼis considered of equal weight to the ʻappointment of 
the Prime Minister  ʼas they both fall into the category of ʻappointive resourcesʼ. Moreover, 
some of these indexes of presidential power do not include the, in my view, crucial feature of 
a separate popular mandate for the presidency by way of a direct popular election. Lijphart 
has argued that this item is the major source of presidential power as “presidents derive 
considerable strength from their direct popular election and the fact that they can claim that 
they (and their vice presidents, if any) are the only public officials elected by the people as a 
whole”(Lijphart 1999, 128). 
A second major difference of my measure compared to other measures of 
presidentialism is that I go beyond mere analysis of presidential powers and prerogatives, yet 
I include systematic characteristics of political systems as a whole. Presidentialism is more 
than pure presidential powers. By taking into account both features from ʻ pure presidentialism  ʼ
and ʻpure parliamentarism  ʼ and adopting a two-dimensional approach (the subtraction of 
the parliamentary score from the presidential score) my measure come closer to the actual 
character of the political systems under review. Both the inclusion of the popular mandate of 
the head of the executive as well as the two-dimensional analysis the score closer represents 
what are theoretically considered core elements of presidentialism.
 Sources for the data for the twelve Central and East European countries under analysis 
I use Raina (1995) and internet-based constitition-finders.5 These data will be checked against the 
database collected by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000), which is an update and expansion 
of earlier studies (Budge and Keman 1992; Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 1993; 1997).6 
This database includes information on 48 countries of their formal constitutional arrangements. 
The authors state that they “have included only those democracies that can be characterised as 
parliamentary or semi-presidential. Hence, only those political systems are included (…) where 
government is (fully) responsible to parliament, with or without features of dual leadership and 
alternating dominance of either the executive or the legislature” (Woldendorp et al. 2000, 4). 
Because the authors focus on party government, they state that presidential democracies are not 
included in this study. In ʻpure  ʼpresidential systems ”the head of state or president is the sole 
executive and only responsible to the constitution, there is no government consisting of ministers 
who are individually responsible to parliament and are collectively responsible for governmental 
action at the same time”(Woldendorp et al. 2000, 3). The authors do assert that semi-presidential 
democracies are included since in these systems governments are responsible to parliament or 
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executive power is shared between the head of state and the Prime Minister in a so-called dual 
leadership (see also Blondel 1992). Although a large number of Central and East European political 
systems are not included, the available cases differ sufficiently to move beyond categorisation 
and establish the relative level of presidentialism of these twelve systems. In addition I use the 
study by Frye (1997) who measures presidential power with 27 formal constitutional powers. 
In table 3 I have summarised the powers of East-Central European presidents (for the specific 
constitutional articles as well as the explanation of the variables and scores see the Appendix. 
Note that the seven features of table 2 can now be found in the upper row of table 3).
Table 3. Level of presidentialism of CEE countries on the basis of their constitutions
Country Election 
president
Dissolution 
parliament
Ministerial 
appointment
Vote of 
Investiture
Vote of 
confidence
Introduce 
Legislation
Executive 
powers
Presidential 
Score
Bulgaria Direct* Pr (+Pa) Pr (+ Pf) Yes Yes No (v) Yes 3.5
Czech Rep. Indirect Pr + Pa Pr + PM Yes Yes No No 1.0
Estonia Indirect Pr + PM Pr + Pa Yes Yes No ## No 1.0
Hungary Indirect Pr (+Pa) Pa + PM Yes Yes Yes Yes 3.0
Latvia Indirect Pr + Rf Pr + Pa Yes Yes*** Yes No 2.5
Lithuania Direct Pr + PM Pr + Pa + PM Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.0
Macedonia Direct Pa Pr + Pf + Pa Yes Yes No No 1.5
Poland Direct Pa (+ Pr) Pr + Pa + PM Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.0
Romania Direct Pr (+Pa) Pr + Pa + PM Yes Yes No (v) No 2.5
Russia Direct Pr Pr (+ Pa)# Yes** No Yes (v) Yes 6.5
Slovakia Indirect Pr Pr + PM Yes Yes Yes No 2.5
Slovenia Direct Pr + Pa Pr + Pa Yes Yes No No 2.0
Data from Woldendorp et al. 2000; Frye 1997; Baylis 1996; Easter 1997; Raina 1995. For a description and weighting of the variables and 
the scores see the Appendix. *In Bulgaria: before the direct election of Stojanov the first two presidents were indirectly elected. **In Russia: 
the president can ignore the loss of a vote of investiture. ***According to Art. 59 of the Latvian constitution the motion of confidence must 
be directed against the Prime Minister, but the government must resign when the vote is lost. # In Russia: if Parliament rejects the presidentʼs 
candidate for Prime Minister three times, the president can dissolve both Houses of Parliament and call new elections. ## The president 
of Estonia can initiate amendments to the Constitution. The (v) in the column ʻIntroduce Legislation  ʼindicates that the president can veto 
legislation from Parliament.
Table 4. Level of parliamentarism in CEE country on the basis of their constitutions
Country Election 
president
Dissolution 
parliament
Ministerial 
appointment
Vote of 
Investiture
Vote of 
confidence
Introduce 
Legislation
Executive 
powers
Parliamentary 
Score
Bulgaria 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 4.0
Czech Rep. 1 0.5 0 1 1 1 1 5.5
Estonia 1 0 0.5 1 1 1 1 5.5
Hungary 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 5.0
Latvia 1 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 5.0
Lithuania 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 3.5
Macedonia 0 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 5.5
Poland 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 4.0
Romania 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 4.5
Russia 0 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 0 2.0
Slovakia 1 0 0 1 1 0.5 1 4.5
Slovenia 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 5.0
Data from Woldendorp et al. 2000; Frye 1997; Baylis 1996; Easter 1997; Raina 1995. For a description and weighting of the variables and 
the scores see the Appendix.
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In seven countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovenia) the 
president is elected by a direct popular vote. As can be seen from table 3, in some countries (such 
as Slovenia) this is about the only presidential characteristic of the political system, whereas 
in other states (such as the Russian Federation) the popularly elected president has substantial 
additional formal powers. Since the adoption of the new constitution in 1993, the Russian 
president is given the power to dissolve both houses of the Duma, appoint the Prime Minister, 
and introduce legislation as well as veto parliamentary legal initiatives. Only a two-third majority 
in both Houses can overturn this veto. The Duma can adopt a vote of no confidence against the 
government with a simple majority, but if it does so twice within three months the president can 
dissolve parliament and call new elections. In addition, the Russian president can ignore a vote of 
investiture. In five cases (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia) it is parliament 
that elects the president, indicating a more parliamentary system where the president does not 
have its own direct popular mandate.
 With the exception of Macedonia, all East European heads of state are involved in the 
dissolution of Parliament. Only the Macedonian parliament has the right to dissolve itself, a very 
rare procedure in democratic systems. In most cases the power to dissolve parliament is shared 
between the head of state and the Prime Minister or parliament, balancing the executive and 
legislative. In Latvia, Russia and Slovakia the president can single-handedly dissolve parliament 
according to the constitution, although in practice consultation with the political leadership in 
parliament is the norm (see also Woldendorp et al. 2000). The Latvian presidential prerogative 
to dissolve parliament and call new elections is curtailed by the fact that this proposal has to be 
followed by a referendum, in which a majority of the electorate has to support this proposal. If 
the electorate rejects the proposal the president is considered to have resigned. Clearly this strong 
disincentive for presidents to propose dissolution is a check on presidential power.
In the large majority of the cases parliament is the most important actor in the formation 
of government, which in turn is the supreme executive body. The president can usually only 
nominate ministers (including the Prime Minister), but only after consultation or formal 
approval of parliament can cabinet ministers be appointed. This clearly shows the pervasive 
parliamentary character of the new democracies, where the survival of governments depends 
on the confidence of parliament. Presidential powers are often limited and checked. In Poland, 
for example, the position of the president in ministerial appointments is relatively weak: if the 
president fails to put forward a candidate which has sufficient support in parliament, the Sejm 
may choose the Prime Minister and other cabinet members with a majority vote. Prevalence of 
parliamentarism in Central and East European democracies is also visible in the fact that in all 
twelve cases parliament needs to approve of a government with a vote of investiture, indicating 
the requirement of confidence in the legislative. The more presidential character of Russia is 
indicated by the fact that the president can dissolve parliament in the case of multiple rejections 
of his Prime Minister designate. Pure presidential government is, as stated above, characterised 
by the lack of governmental responsibility to parliament. In all these twelve cases parliament can 
put forward a motion of confidence against the government and usually also against individual 
ministers, thereby determining the tenure of the government. Thus, in the new democracies the 
survival of government is dependent on the confidence of parliament (Russia, as stated before, is 
the notable exception).
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The right to draft legislation primarily rests with the cabinet in most of the ECE countries, 
although (next to the Russian head of state) the presidents of Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Slovakia can also propose legislation. Although in most countries the president can influence 
the life span of governments, in only half of the cases have Presidents been given direct executive 
powers. Even where presidents have constitutionally determined executive responsibilities, these 
are usually very limited and seldom outside the field of national defence and foreign affairs.
 When we analyse the core elements of presidentialism and parliamentarism on the basis 
of constitutional provisions it becomes clear that, at least in this sample; the Russian president 
is by far the most powerful president in ECE countries. Polish and Lithuanian presidents are 
more powerful than Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian heads of state, while the weakest 
presidencies (i.e. more parliamentary systems) are found in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Estonia, Macedonia and Slovenia (see also Frye 1997, 547; McGregor 1994, 23-32; Baylis 1997, 
303; Ishiyama 1995, 155).
Levels of presidentialism and parliamentarism in East and Central Europe
On the basis of these core constitutional elements it is now possible to determine more 
precisely the level of presidentialism (see Appendix) instead of relying on mere classification. 
It is important to emphasize that, in contradistinction to other scales of presidentialism, I argue 
that both the level of presidentialism and the level of parliamentarism should be part of one 
single measure. Therefore, in the table below, I have calculated the level of Presidentialism 
by subtracting the score of Parliamentarism from the Score of Presidentialism. Thus, a higher 
score indicates a higher level of presidentialism.
Table 5. Presidentialism and parliamentarism in East-Central European countries
Country Presidential Score Parliamentary Score Level of Presidentialism
Bulgaria 3.5 4.0 - 0.5
Czech Republic 1.0 5.5 - 4.5
Estonia 1.0 5.5 - 4.5
Hungary 3.0 5.0 - 2.0
Latvia 2.5 5.0 - 2.5
Lithuania 4.0 3.5 + 0.5
Macedonia 1.5 5.5 - 4.0
Poland 4.0 4.0   0.0
Romania 2.5 4.5 - 2.0
Russia 6.5 2.0 + 4.5
Slovakia 2.5 4.5 - 2.0
Slovenia 2.0 5.0 - 3.0
The level of presidentialism is calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score. A positive score indicates 
presidentialism and a negative score indicates parliamentarism. This score of the level of presidentialism correlates highly with the scores of 
Frey (r² = .86**).
10 11
Overall, the level of presidentialism is low in these twelve countries. Only two systems have a 
positive score, indicating that powerful presidencial systems are the exception rather than the 
rule in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, one of these two countries, Lithuania, has a very 
limited presidential system as a result of a relatively high score on the scale of parliamentarism. 
Thus, the only strong presidential system emerging from this analysis is Russia, which also has 
the lowest score of these East-Central European systems on the parliamentary scale. On the 
other end of the spectrum of institutional arrangements i.e. strong parliamentary systems, we 
find the Czech Republic and Estonia. Also Macedonia and Slovenia have a relatively high score 
of parliamentarism vis-à-vis the score on the presidentialism scale. Parliamentary systemic 
features is also dominant in Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia, although presidents do 
wield some important powers here. In Lithuania, Bulgaria and particularly Poland the drafters 
of the constitution seem to have avoided a firm decision in favour of either presidentialism or 
parliamentarism, instead they opted for a balanced division of power between parliament and 
the president. Evidently, the elite of these new democracies thought it important to check and 
balance legislative and executive powers.
 These findings are not surprising when we take into account that the new democracies in 
East-Central Europe emerged from grim experiences with totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. 
Rather than opting for a singular, strong executive (like American presidentialism) and other 
forms of power concentration, elites are more likely to favour a system in which the executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers are widely dispersed, checked and decentralised. This is, 
however, not without risks. “From the trauma of the former illiberal practice this [power 
dispersion] would be intelligible but at the same time it generates an enormous dilemma in new 
democracies. Citizens usually have high hopes and expectations from the new ʻdemocratic  ʼ
regime. In order to generate and maintain legitimacy of the new democracy it needs to deliver 
to the electorate. When power is widely dispersed and organisations such as political parties 
weak, bureaucracies are still filled with incompetent and corrupt bureaucrats it is hard to deliver 
the goods of government” (Krouwel and Verbeek 1999, 335).Presidentialism, parliamentarism 
and government stability.
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Although the main aim of this paper is to suggest a new method of measuring the relative 
level of ʻpresidentialism  ʼ and ʻparliamentarism  ʼ of political systems, we nevertheless 
can use this score of relative presidentialism for a simple analysis of the crucial systemic 
relationship between the executive and legislative, particularly in terms of political stability. 
According to Lijphart (1999, 129) the best indicator for the relative power balance between 
the legislative and executive branches of government is cabinet durability. A higher rate of 
survival would indicate cabinet (or executive) dominance over the legislature. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between the level of presidentialism as calculated above and the survival 
rate of government in our twelve cases.8 As can be seen from the distribution of the cases 
the correlation between presidentialism and cabinet duration is negative and weak (r² = -
.34).9 This suggests that parliamentary origin and higher levels of dependence on legislative 
confidence (i.e. parliamentarism) have a moderate positive effect on governmental survival 
than the theoretically more plausible assumption that governments survive because of their 
ability to dominate over Parliament. Higher levels of presidentialism have a negative effect on 
government stability.
 In order to corroborate this finding (which itself is interesting as theoretically one 
would assume that executive dominance would lead to higher levels of government survival) I 
have used an alternative method to measure the relative power balance between the executive 
and parliament. This measure is developed by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000). They 
construct a variable, the ʻexecutive-legislative balanceʼ, which measures the relative power 
balance between the government and parliament and the extent to which the head of state can 
influence the composition and existence of governments (see Appendix I). A positive score 
on this variable implies dominance of parliament over the executive powers (including the 
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presidency); a negative score implies dominance of the executive over parliament. Since my 
measurement is partly based on the same variables and measurements, I have opted here for a 
comparison with Fryeʼs scale of presidentialism instead of the one I developed above (for their 
measurements see Appendix I).10 Figure 2 provides a comparison of presidential powers with 
the Woldendorp et al. - measure of executive-legislative power balance.
Data for the presidential powers are derived from Frye (1997) who developed a rating of presidential powers based on 27 formal powers 
(see Appendix.). For the executive-legislative balance of power I have used the data from Woldendorp et al. (2000). ʻExecutive legal 
balance  ʼindicates the power balance between the executive and legislative powers. A positive score implies dominance of parliament over 
the executive powers (including the presidency); a negative score implies dominance of the executive over parliament. 
When we examine the pattern of power dispersion between executives and legislatures in East-
Central European systems, it emerges that the drafters of most constitutions have opted for 
a relative balance between the executive and legislative. Both extremes the upper left corner 
representing parliamentary dominance and the lower right corner representing executive 
dominance are virtually empty. The two countries that have high levels of parliamentary 
dominance are Macedonia and Hungary, where weak presidential powers are paralleled with 
a strong parliament. The only country in which the executive dominates is Russia, although 
it must be stated that the initial powers of the Russian presidency (before 1993) were more 
limited (Easter 1997). Five cases (Slovakia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and to a lesser 
extent Slovenia) cluster around the position in the two-dimensional space that represents a 
non-decisive constitution. In these countries the powers of the president are very limited and 
neither parliament nor the executive have a dominant position. In particular the Czech Republic 
and Latvia are cases where none of the actors can, on the basis of formal constitutional rules, 
dictate the course of events. This may go a long way in explaining the lengthy institutional 
battle in the Czech Republic battle between the then president Vavlac Havel and the leaders of 
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the two major parties in parliament (Klaus and Zeman). In Slovakia even deeper antagonisms 
exist between President Michal Kovac and the leader of the dominant party HZDS, Vavlac 
Meciar. Since 1993 Meciar has attempted, and partly succeeded, in stripping the president 
from some of his constitutional executive powers. 
 According to Woldendorp et al. (2000) the executive-legislative relationship is equally 
balanced in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. That one of the political actors can benefit from 
such a situation can be illustrated by the developments in Romania. Particularly until 1996 
president Ion Illiescu, once part of the Ceausescu-nomenklatura, wielded substantial power on 
the basis of extra-constitutional resources. Next to his hold over the largest parliamentary party 
(PDSR) Illiescu presented himself as a dissident and member of the ʻrevolutionary  ʼNational 
Salvation Front which overthrew the Ceaucescu regime. When this did not suffice he called 
upon an army of coal-miners to deal with his protesting political enemies.12
 This type of analysis allow us to better understand the problems with overall systemic 
stability in newly democratising countries. In an earlier publication (Krouwel and Verbeek 
1999) I have argued that there are two possible ʻsystemic black holes  ʼfor new democracies. 
The first can be found in the upper right corner, where a strong presidency would be combined 
with a strong parliament. No doubt, such a systemic format leads to major conflicts over 
competencies between parliament and the presidency. The opposite situation would amount 
to a system characterised by a weak presidency combined with a frail parliament, amounting 
to a country without a political centre that can make authoritative decisions. We called these 
extremes ʻblack holes  ʼ because countries which would adopt this pattern of legislative-
executive powers would certainly be torn apart by constitutional conflict and governmental 
stalemate. Most of the new East-Central European democracies seem to have been able to avoid 
constitutional choices leading to these deadlocks between the executive and the legislature.
Presidentialisation or parliamentarisation of East-Central European 
countries?
A final point I would like to make in this paper is that this new relative measure does not 
only allow us to make more precise characterisations of political systems, it also allows us to 
analyse the transformation development of political systems over time. We will thus be able 
to answer the question whether the new democracies in East-Central Europe are moving from 
strong parliamentarism into a presidential direction. This is important in the light of the claim 
by Linz and Stepan (1978) that democracies in Latin America broke down because of such a 
deadlock between an assertive and powerful legislature and a strong presidential executive. 
Other authors also argued that presidentialism is less responsive than parliamentarism, as 
a fixed term in executive office leaves failing presidents in office without the possibility of 
replacement. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1978) also recommend democratising countries to 
move into the direction of parliamentarism instead of presidentialism, because legislative 
prominence will lead to stronger and more disciplined political parties.
 Even without using the relative level of presidentialism developed above one could 
argue that the collapse of the communist party executive (usually referred to as the Central 
Committee) is in itself a move to presidentialism, at least in constitutional terms. Nevertheless, 
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the chairman of the communist party had substantial power akin to presidential powers. 
When we take the year 1989 as a starting-point of analysis, it is clear that Russia has moved 
radically into the direction of strong presidentialism. From the battle between the Supreme 
Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov and newly elected president Yeltsin between 1991 and 1993, 
Yeltsin emerged as the victor. The new constitution, adopted after a referendum in December 
1993, changed the balance of power on at least five of the core elements of presidentialism. 
Government survival became independent on parliamentary confidence, while the president 
also gained more power in the nomination of the Prime Ministers and other ministers. More 
power was also given to the president in the dissolution of government and the president 
gained substantial executive powers as well as the right to veto parliamentary legislation 
(Easter 1997; Banks and Muller 1998). Poland also adopted a constitutional modification 
that impacted on the core characteristics of presidentialism. In 1990 indirect election of the 
president was replaced by direct popular election. Subsequent changes in 1992 also redefined 
the relation between the legislature and the executive; the president no longer had the right to 
dismiss parliament, yet was given greater authority in the appointment of the Prime Minister 
and the right to reject candidates put forward by the Sejm. In Romania it was not constitutional 
innovation that gave both president Illiescu and Constantinescu increasing power, rather this 
process occurred within the constitutional framework. Year on year there was little consensus 
in parliament on policies so that both presidents increasingly had to rule by decree. This type 
of ʻpolitical presidentialisation  ʼthus differs from the ʻconstitutional presidentialisation  ʼvisible 
in Russia and to a lesser extent in Poland.
 Despite the trend towards presidentialisation in Russia, Poland and Romania, the 
dominant trend in East-Central Europe seems to go in the opposite direction. The Slovenian 
constitution of 1991 reduced the presidency to a largely ceremonial function, vesting most 
powers with the Prime Minister. A minute shift in the direction of parliamentarism is also found 
in Estonia. A majority of the participants at the Estonian round-table negotiations favoured a 
return to the parliamentary system of the interbellum. Direct presidential elections were only 
used in the first round of the founding presidential elections. Since then the system has moved 
towards parliamentarism with indirect elections of the head of State. Since the partition of 
Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic has moved slightly into the parliamentarist direction. The 
antagonism between Prime Minister Meciar and president Kovacs led to several attempts by 
Meciar to remove executive powers from the precidency. Both in 1995 and 1998 he succeeded 
in creating a political situation in which the Prime Minister could assume the presidential 
executive prerogatives in the field of national defence and internal security. Although Meciar 
was unable to affect any of the other core system aspects or to formally change the constitution, 
this still left Slovakia clearly in the parliamentarist camp. In all the other countries the crucial 
dimensions of the system are not affected. In the case of the Czech Republic the dissolution 
of the Czechoslovak federation did not lead to power shifts on the crucial dimensions of 
presidentialism. Although opposition parties favoured a direct election of the president, the 
dominant party – Klaus  ʼ ODS – rejected this proposal since it would strengthen President 
Havelʼs position. Hungarian politicians have also left the original constitutional format largely 
unchanged since in 1990 a referendum on the direct election of the president failed because 
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of insufficient turnout. In 1995 the constitutional conflict emerged again over direct election 
of the president and other constitutional amendments, yet no agreement could be reached and 
none of the proposed modifications were implemented. In Latvia and Lithuania there have not 
been any constitutional changes that impact the core elements of presidentialism. In Latvia 
the tenure of parliament was increased from three to four years, but the legislative-executive 
relationship remained untouched. Under siege by Soviet troops a referendum was held in 
Lithuania in 1992 over presidential powers. None of the proposals was adopted as a result 
of insufficient turnout. Four years later new proposals for constitutional reform failed again, 
resulting in an unchanged situation.
 From this we can conclude that East-Central European countries have neither embarked 
on a uniform transformation in the direction of presidentialism nor shown a propensity to move 
consistently towards parliamentarism. Poland, Romania and particularly Russia have moved 
towards the presidential end of the scale on the crucial systemic features, while most of the 
other countries parliamentary powers have increased (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia) or countries 
have remained stable parliamentary systems.
Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a new method of measuring the relative level of presidentialism 
and parliamentarism of political systems. This measure allows a more precise characterisation 
of political systems and analysis of systemic transformation over time. Also, this relative 
measure of presidentialism and parliamentarism can be used to closer examine the assumed 
relationship between different regime types and their stability. Contrary to theoretical 
assumptions, it emerged that there is a negative relationship between the level of presidentialism 
and government stability. Analysis on the basis of an alternative measure of both the executive-
legislative balance and the level of presidentialism concluded that most East and Central 
European (ECE) democracies have opted for relative balanced power relations between the 
legislature and the executive. Over time, ECE countries have shown movement towards higher 
levels of parliamentarism and less towards a presidential type of political regime (with the 
exception of Russia and to a much smaller extent Poland and Romania). This relative measure 
of the character of political systems has thus proven useful in analysing and explaining political 
developments and political stability in ECE.
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Appendix. Measurement of variables
Some of these variables have been taken from the database collected by Woldendorp et al. (2000), yet these 
variables have been re-coded in order to indicate the level of presidentialism and the level of parliamentarism.
Election of the Head of State (president)
Presidentialism
Direct election =    1 
Indirect election by Parliament = 0 
Parliamentarism
Direct election =    0 
Indirect election by Parliament = 1 
Dissolution of Parliament = the prerogative of dissolving parliament rests with:
Mo = Monarch/Head of State
Pr = President/Head of State
Pa = Parliament
PM = Prime Minister
Gov = Government
Rf = the electorate by means of popular Referendum
Note that in many cases it involves two or more actors who must act together (indicated by a +) or by means of 
mutual consultation (indicated by brackets).
Presidentialism
When it is the sole prerogative of the President to dissolve Parliament the score is 1; when the President shares 
the power to dissolve parliament with another actor the score is 0,5; when the President has no formal power to 
influence the tenure of Parliament the score is 0.
Parliamentarism
When it is the prerogative parliament itself to dissolve Parliament the score is 1; when Parliament shares this 
power with another actor the score is 0,5; when Parliament has no formal constitutional competence in its 
dissolution the score is 0.
Ministerial appointments = the power to appoint ministers (including the Prime Minister) and influence the 
individual ministerial portfolio allocation and/or party composition of government.
Pr = President (Head of State)
Pt = Extra parliamentary political parties
Pf = Parliamentary parties
PM = Prime Minister
Note that in many cases it involves two or more actors who must act together (indicated by +) or by means of 
mutual consultation (indicated by brackets).
Presidentialism
When the President appoints ministers (including the Prime Minister) the score is 1, when the President shares the 
power to appoint ministers and/or influence the portfolio allocation with Parliament or another actor the score is 
0,5; when the President has no formal power to influence portfolio allocation, the score is 0.
Parliamentarism
When the prerogative of appointing ministers (including the Prime Minister) rests with the (extra) parliamentary 
parties the score is 1, when the partyleaders share this power to appoint ministers and/or influence the portfolio 
allocation with another actor the score is 0,5; when political parties have no formal power to influence portfolio 
allocation, the score is 0.
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Vote of Investiture
Investiture = Formal vote of Investiture is required before a government takes office
Presidentialism
No = not required (presidentialism). Score is 1.
Yes = vote of investiture is required (parliamentarism) Score is 0.
Parliamentarism
No = not required (presidentialism). Score is 0.
Yes = vote of investiture is required (parliamentarism) Score is 1.
Vote of Confidence
Confidence = Government must resign if it loses the Vote of Confidence.
Presidentialism
1 = Not required (or can be ignored by the government): cabinet is not fully dependent on 
confidence in Parliament = presidentalism
0 = Losing a vote of (non-)confidence always results in the resignation of government (or, 
alternatively, in the dissolution of parliament ) = parliamentarism.
Parliamentarism
0 = Not required (or can be ignored by the government): cabinet is not fully dependent on 
confidence in Parliament = presidentalism
1 = Losing a vote of (non-)confidence always results in the resignation of government (or, 
alternatively, in the dissolution of parliament ) = parliamentarism.
Introduction and veto of legislation
Introduction Legislation
Presidentialism
 1 = President has right to propose legislation.
 0,5 = President can veto legislation from Parliament = indicated by a (v) in the table.
 0 = President can not propose nor veto legislation.
Parliamentarism
1 = Parliament has sole right to propose legislation.
 0,5 = President can veto legislation from Parliament = indicated by a (v) in the table.
(0 = this score, indicating that Parliament is not the legislative, is a contradictio in terminis in a 
democracy)
Executive Powers
Executive Powers = the locus of executive power
Pr = President/Head of State
Gvt = Government
Presidentialism
When the president has executive powers the score is 1; when executive power is shared with the government, the 
score is 0,5 and when the president has no executive power the score is 0.
Parliamentarism
When a government originating from parliament has the exclusive executive authority the score is 1; when 
executive power is shared with for example the president the score is 0,5 and when government is not responsible 
to parliament but to the president the score is 0.
Parliamentary-Governmental powerbalance (dualism/monism)
Parl−Gov = Extent to which Parliament is dominant over Government. It is a cumulative index: 
It is constructed by adding up scores of:
1. Vote of Investiture is necessary condition to govern (1,0)
2. Vote of Confidence is necessary condition to continue to govern (1,0).
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HoS-Parl = Extent to which the Head of State can influence the composition and 
(continuation) of the existence of a Government. Hence, it indicates the independent power of the Head 
of State vis-à-vis Parliament. This variable is constructed by adding up the scores of:
1. HoS is directly involved in the formation of Government (0,5)
2. HoS can dissolve Parliament (0.5)
3. HoS has also executive powers (1,0).
Gov-Parl = Extent to which Government is dominant over Parliament. 
It is constructed by adding up scores of:
1. Government can ignore losing a Vote of Confidence (score is 1,0)
2. Government (or PM) can dissolve Parliament: 1,0 
3. if shared with Head of State, then score is 0,5
Executive-Legislative Power Balance
The measurement of the power balance between the executive and legislature is a composite index constructed of 
three variables: PARLGOV – (HOSGOV + GOVPARL).
PARLGOV is the extent to which parliament is dominant over government. This is measured by adding (1 = yes; 
0 = no) up the scores of (A) is a vote of investiture a necessary condition to govern, (B) is a vote of confidence a 
necessary condition to continue and (C) the existence of strong bi-cameralism (see Lijphart 1984: 99-104). 
HOSGOV is the extent to which the head of state can influence the composition and existence of a government. 
This is measured by adding the scores (1 = yes and 0 = no) of (A) HoS is directly involved in the formation of 
government, (B) HoS can dissolve parliament and (C) HoS also has executive powers.
GOVPARL is the extent to which government is dominant over parliament (1 = yes; 0 = no), measured by (A) 
can government ignore losing a vote of confidence, (B) can government (or PM) dissolve parliament and (C) 
existence of weak bi-cameralism.
Constitutional articles on which table 3. is based
Country Election 
president
Dissolution 
government
Ministerial 
appointment
Vote of 
Investiture
Vote of 
confidence
Introduce 
Legislation
Executive 
powers
Bulgaria 93.1 98.1 & 102.2 99.1 84 & 89 89, 111 & 112 86 + 101 100 & 98
Czech Rep. 54.2 35 & 62 62a & 74 68 71, 72 & 73 15.1 62, 63 & 64
Estonia 79.1 62 78.8,  89.1, 90 & 92 89.2 89, 92, 97 & 98 59 & 103.1.5 & 
78.8
86
Hungary 29/A.1 28 33.3 & 33.4 33 & 39 39/A & 3/A.d 25.1 & 30/A.f 19/A/B/C
Latvia 35 48 56 - 59 47 & 65 44 & 46
Lithuania 78.2 58, 59 & 87 92 92.4 & 92.5 61 71 & 72 67, 84 & 85
Macedonia 80 93 & 94 84 & 90 90 92 88 & 86 86
Poland 29.1 & 29.2 64 to 66 46, 57 to 62 58 57, 59, 66 to 68 46 32 to 38
Romania 81.1 105, 106 & 109 85.2 102 85.1 73 to 78 86,87, 91 to 94
Russia 81.1 83 83.a, 111 & 112 83 & 111 103 & 117 84, 107, 114 
& 115
Slovakia 101.1 8 & 89 86 & 102.f 86 86, 88, 113 to 
115
87 102
Slovenia 103 115 & 116 111, 115 111, 117 116 87, 88 102, 107 & 
108
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Presidential power according to Frye
Frey (1997) bases his measurement of presidential power of 27 formal powers: Powers shared with the Assembly 
are counted as 0.5. This scale of presidential power highly correlates with similar scales (see Shugart and Carey 
1992)
The included presidential powers:
1. Dissolve Parliament
2. Call Referendums
3. Call Elections
4. Appoints Prime-Minister
5. Appoints ministers
6. Appoints Constitutional Court
7. Appoints Supreme Court
8. Appoints judges
9. Appoints prosecutor general
10. Appoints Head of Central Bank
11. Appoints Security Council
12. Appoints senior officers
13. Appoints senior commanders
14. Commander in Chief of Armed Forces
15. Chairs National Security Council
16. Remands law for reconsideration – two thirds override = 1
17. Sends laws to Constitutional Court
18. Proposes legislation
19. Issues decrees in non-emergencies – no review = 1
20. Proposes amendments to Constitution
21. Calls special sessions of Parliament
22. Special powers if Parliament is unable to meet
23. Assumes emergency powers at other times
24. Participation in parliamentary sessions
25. May address or send messages to Parliament
26. May convene cabinet sessions
27. Participation in cabinet sessions
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Notes
1 To develop a valid and unambiguous definition, Sartoriʼs method of concept reconstruction and formation 
is useful (Sartori 1970; 1984; 1991). Sartoriʼs methodology implies that, first, the meaning (connotation) 
of a concept must be reconstructed by enumerating all characteristics mentioned in the literature in order 
to establish what exactly characterises a phenomenon. The aim of this exercise is to find a common core of 
characteristics and organise these constituent abstract elements in a meaningful and valid manner (Sartori 
1984, 50). Sartori (1984, 55) argues that the “crux of (re)conceptualisation consists of separating the 
defining (core) properties (or necessary characteristics) from the accompanying properties (or contingent and 
accidental characteristics).” The defining properties delineate the extension of the concept, that is all objects 
to which the concept applies (Sartori 1984, 24).
2 In this paper I will limit the analysis to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation (referred to as Russia), Slovakia and Slovenia. In some 
instances I will refer to other system in central and eastern Europa as a means of illustration, but the database 
focuses on the countries enumerated above.
3 Shugart and Carey (1992, 26) distinguish six types of democratic regimes: parliamentary, presidential, 
premier-presidential, president-parliamentary, parliamentary with president and assembly independent.
4 On the basis of these criteria Lijphart (1992; 1999) distinguishes between eight types of systems, yet admits 
that these typologies are not mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive.
5 For the constitutions not included in Raina (1995) I have used the internet sites with the respective constitutions 
(see the literature list).
6 I would like to thank Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge for allowing me to use that data from 
this study.
7 “How can the relative power of the executive and legislative branches of government be measured? For 
parliamentary systems the best indicator is cabinet durability. A cabinet that stays in power for a long time 
is likely to be dominant vis-a-vis the legislature, and a short-lived cabinet is likely to be relatively weak” 
(Lijphart 1999, 129). This argument is not totally sound and tenable: a strong legislature may stretch the 
life-span of a weak government when Parliament can push its own agenda and influence cabinet members. In 
addition, as Lijphart himself admits: while cabinets may be short-lived, individual ministers can serve again 
in subsequent cabinets. As a measure of government survival I use the concept of cabinet durability, or better 
ʻrate of survival  ʼ(Taylor and Herman 1971; Sanders and Herman 1977) which measures the percentage of 
the maximum constitutionally determined tenure.
8 A cabinet ends its administration (a) after an election even when it returns with the same Prime Minister and 
party composition; after (b) a change of Prime Minister; (c) a change in the party composition of the cabinet.
9 The correlation between the ʻlevel of parliamentarism  ʼand the governmental ʻrate of survival  ʼis r² .39
10 In the cases of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland we see that Fryeʼs scale assigns a higher level of 
presidentialism to some systems, mainly on the basis of powers not regarded as core elements in my 
definition outlined above.
11 Our sample is somewhat biased because of the exclusion of countries such as Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, 
Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmernistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, which are all strong 
presidential systems (see Frye 1997, 547).
12 Romania is also a special case in that during the transition the participants at the round-table negotiations 
only needed two meetings in five days to draft the new constitutional format (Welsh 1994).
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